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et al.: County Court

JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COURT
N. Y CONST. art. VI, § 11 (a):
The county court shall have jurisdiction over the following
classes of actions and proceedings which shall be originated in
such county court in the mannerprovided by law ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Scalza7 98
(decided October 18, 1990)

A criminal defendant, convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon and ammunition, claimed that the state's
Criminal Procedure Law section 255.20(4)'799 which allows for
the delegation of pretrial hearings to an authorized judicial
hearing officer (JHO), was violative of the New York State
Constitution. The defendant asserted two claims: (1) that the
statute, both facially and as applied, violated sections 108o and
11801 of article VI as an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
duties; and (2) that the statute violated the state constitution's due
process clause.802
The court of appeals held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional under sections 10 and 11 of article VI and that it
did not violate defendant's due process rights. 80 3 The court did
798. 76 N.Y.2d 604, 563 N.E.2d 705, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1990).
799. N.Y. CRam. PRoc. LAW § 255.20(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991).

800. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 10, cl. a. ("The county court is continued in
each county outside the city of New York. There shall be at least one judge of
the county court in each county and such number of additional judges in each
county as may be provided by law. The judges shall be residents of the county
and shall be chosen by the electors of the county.").
801. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 11, cl. a.

802. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law."). The defendant relied solely on the

New York State Constitution. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 606, 563 N.E.2d at 70506, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.

803. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 609-610, 563 N.E.2d at 707-08, 562 N.Y.S.2d
at 16-17.
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not address the defendant's claim that the statute was unconstitutional as applied because the defendant did not object to the qualifications of the JHO and, therefore, failed to preserve the claim
for appeal. 804
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a suppression motion with the
county court wherein he asserted that the police obtained improper consent to search his home on the basis of threats made by
the police. He also claimed that he was denied representation by
counsel. 80 5 The county court, pursuant to section 255.20(4), referred the suppression motion to an authorized JHO.806 Under
this section, a JHO is responsible for gathering findings of facts,
conclusions of law and making recommendations to the referring
court regarding whether to grant or deny the suppression motion.
In the case at bar, the JHO received defendant's motion and
recommended that it be denied. The county court followed the
JIO's recommendation and ultimately convicted the defendant of
six counts of criminal possession of weapons and ammunition. 80 7
On appeal, the court began its analysis by discussing the statutory intent and history of the challenged provision. The court observed that the statute was enacted to allow the trial judge more
time to conduct more trials as opposed to hearing pre-trial motions, thereby reducing the backlog and delay of criminal
trials. 808 In regard to the defendant's claim that the statute
permits an unconstitutional delegation of a judicial duty, the court
noted that the statute still "recognizes and preserves the trial
court's nondelegable and exclusive authority to decide the
suppression motion." ' 80 9 The section further provides that the
trial judge retain "plenary power to reject, accept or modify the
804. Id. at 610, 563 N.E.2d at 708, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
805. Id. at 613 n.1, 563 N.E.2d at 710 n.1, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 19 n.1.
(Titone, J., dissenting).
806. Id. at 606, 563 N.E.2d at 705, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The defendant's

suppression motion sought to exclude evidence of seized contraband and
statements made by him to the police. Id. at 607, 563 N.E.2d at 706, 562
N.Y.S.2d at 15.
807. Id. at 606, 563 N.E.2d at 705, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
808. Id. at 608, 563 N.E.2d at 706, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
809. Id. at 608, 563 N.E.2d at 707, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
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JHO's report in whole or in part based on the court's independent
review. ' ' 810 The court then concluded that there was no express
or implied prohibitory language in the state constitution regarding
the delegation of judicial duties. In fact, by increasing the amount
of time the trial judge can devote to hearing criminal trials, the
court observed that the statute "preserves and reinforces" the
court's exclusive power to decide judicial matters. 8 11
In response to defendant's due process claim, the court stated:
We have held that the due process claims under New York's
Constitution, like those raised under the United States
Constitution, require the balancing of factors - 'an evaluation of
the interests of the parties to the dispute, the adequacy of the
contested procedures to protect those interests and the government's stake in the outcome.' 8 12
In the case at bar, the court found that the defendant's due process rights were adequately protected by the procedures of the
statute. The court noted that the defendant was entitled to a
hearing before a JHO where he was permitted to submit his motion papers and arguments before a JHO. In turn, the JHO, after
summarizing the facts and conclusions of law, recommended
what action the trial court should take regarding the motion. As
noted earlier, the trial court still had the discretion to abide by or
disregard the JHO's recommendation. According to the court,
while the defendant's motion was not personally heard before the
trial judge, "the court 'heard' the motion in a customary juridical
sense of that phrase (e.g., deciding or reviewing a matter or
record on submitted papers without oral presentation)."s 813
In addition, the court also found that the statute served the
substantial state interest of reducing delays of criminal trials. The
court noted that the "statutory procedure helps

. . .

by supplying

the court system with the excellent resource of experienced former Judges who may hear, but not determine, time-consuming
pretrial motions as judicial officers to sitting Judges so that the
810.
811.
812.
813.

Id. at 608-09, 563 N.E.2d at 707, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
Id. at 609, 563 N.E.2d at 707, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
Id. at 610, 563 N.E.2d at 708 ,562 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (citation omitted).
Id.
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'8 14
latter can concentrate efficiently on trying eases.
To bolster its argument, the court pointed to a federal statute
which was similar to the challenged statute. Under the Federal
Magistrates Act, 815 a federal district court judge is authorized to
delegate to a magistrate the responsibility of gathering findings of
fact and recommendations of a suppression motion. In United

States v. Raddatz, 816 the United States Supreme Court held the

act did not violate a criminal defendant's due process rights under
the Federal Constitution. 8 17 As in Scalza, the Supreme Court
upheld the act since the district court was still "the ultimate
decisionmaker . . . [and had] the broad discretion to accept,

reject, or modify the magistrate's proposed finding." ' 818 The
Court concluded that due process protections at a suppression
hearing "may be less demanding and elaborate than the
8 19
protections accorded the defendant at the trial itself."
On the issue of the constitutionality of the statute "as applied",
the court of appeals stated that they could not decide the issue
"because the defendant failed to object to the qualification of the
specific JHO to whom this pretrial matter was referred ... * 820

The court, however, noted that the requirements for a JHO had
recently been "strengthened," ' 82 1 which seemed to imply that
prevailing on an as applied constitutional claim may be difficult.
Judge Titone's lengthy dissent attacked the delegation of suppression hearings and the growing trend of such action throughout New York courts. 822 Judge Titone considered such delegation
a "constitutional infirmity," 823 and by adopting article VI, see814. Id.
815. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988).
816. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
817. Id. at 680.
818. Id. at 680-81.
819. Id. at 679, quoted in Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 609, 563 N.E.2d at 708,
562 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
820. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 610, 563 N.E.2d at 708, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
821. Id. (citing N.Y. CoMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 122.1(a)
(1991)).
822. Id. at 611-13, 563 N.E.2d at 708-10, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 17-19 (Titone,
J., dissenting).
823. Id. at 613, 563 N.E.2d at 710, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (Titone, J.,
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tions 10 and 11, "the people of this State have indicated their
wish to have matters within the jurisdiction of the County Courts
determined by judges who are county residents and are chosen by
the county's electors every 10 years." 824 Furthermore, he attacked the lack of due process of such a statute because, inter
alia, "the outcomes of suppression hearings implicate the basic
liberty interests of the accusedl" 825 and "[a] rule that would allow a criminal defendant to face a jail sentence on the basis of
factual findings made by one who has not heard the evidence is.
. . foreign to notions of fair adjudicative procedure embodied in
the Due Process Clause. ' 826 Judge Titone focused on the fact
that this appeal concerned a suppression hearing where the
outcome turned on the credibility of the witness. The judge
discussed how the nature of delegating such a hearing prevents
the ultimate fact finder from seeing the witnesses during this
pretrial motion, which, in his opinion, could have an enormous
detrimental effect on the outcome of a future similar case.
Furthermore, Judge Titone attacked the growing trend of such
delegation to ease the pressure on the New York court system,
citing similar examples from the housing authority and family
courts. 827 He stated that "[i]n light of this recent history, there is
much room for concern about the gradual placement of the traditional judicial system with all its rigidities and awkwardness, in
favor .of one that is more efficient and flexible but rests heavily
8
on the use of nonjudicial personnel." 82
Scalza represents a strong alignment between the court of appeals' outlook on due process rights and that of the United States
Supreme Court with regard to the delegation of judicial hearings.
dissenting).
824. Id. at 613-14, 563 N.E.2d at 710, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
825. Id. at 615, 563 N.E.2d at 711, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).

826. Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 697 (1980))
(ellipses in original) (Titone, J., dissenting).
827. Id. at 616, 563 N.E.2d at 712, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).

828. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1991

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1991], Art. 51

376

TOURO LAW REVIEW

(Vol 8

The court of appeals relied heavily on Raddatz for its validation
of the Federal Magistrates Act in the delegation of United States
District Courts' duties.
The dissent, however, while acknowledging that Raddatz "is
all but dispositive of any claims . . . [of defendant] under the

Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution,", 829 noted that
the New York Court of Appeals "remain[s] free to chart a
separate course under our own State constitutional due process
provisions," 830 and could have done so.

829. Id. at 614, 563 N.E.2d at 710, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
830. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
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